Interview With Patricia Marins, Independent Analyst Focusing on Defense and Security in Europe and Eurasia

1. Can it be said that Iran has won the war between Iran and the United States/Israel? In your view, are the gains Iran has achieved in this context strategic and durable, or merely tactical and temporary?

 

 The goals of the US and Israel were clear: to overthrow the government, denuclearize Iran, reduce the missile program, end funding to regional militias, and cut off the Chinese advantage in the oil trade. All of these goals failed, and instead, there was a military and economic loss exceeding $300 billion for the US, Israel, and Gulf countries. There is no way to say that Trump and Netanyahu came out victorious from this disaster.

 

2. One of the provisions involves establishing a mechanism for collecting tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. What long-term impact could this have on Persian Gulf countries, global maritime trade and shipping, and Iran’s leverage?

 

 I do not believe these fees will actually take effect. It is not just an Iranian issue, but this would trigger similar fees in other straits, making freight more expensive and breaking a global trade norm. Iran uses the fees as a form of pressure to signal that it needs to be compensated somehow for the destruction caused by the war. As forms of compensation are agreed upon, these fees will lose momentum.

 

3. What is your analysis of the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program? Will there ultimately be a final agreement between Iran and the United States?

 

 I see no room for negotiation on the nuclear program right now. After being attacked by two nuclear powers, what country would give up its own program? I do not see the Iranian population supporting such a measure, and I believe that insisting on this could affect governance. Furthermore, Iran has always been clear that it will not make any concessions that the US and Israel failed to achieve through military means. It is possible that Iran might accept limited inspections in exchange for numerous economic concessions, but the uranium will remain in Iran and at levels very close to a nuclear weapon. It is difficult to prevent a wealthy and technologically advanced nation like Iran from having a nuclear weapon if it chooses to. Countries like South Africa, Brazil, and others only gave up their already advanced nuclear programs when they chose to do so.

 

4. What are the main obstacles to reaching a comprehensive final agreement within the 60-day timeframe (or any possible extension)?

 

 The obstacles remain the same, as the points of an agreement are irreconcilable. There will be no reduction in Iran's missile program; instead, there could be an increase in budget and production. Similarly, funding to Hezbollah and other groups is likely to increase, and this happens with every single item on the negotiation agenda. It is insurmountable, and the most the sides can do is kick the can down the road with lies and manipulation so that the pre-war status quo remains, without the population realizing what a wasteful expense this war was.

 

5. How could this agreement affect Lebanon and the broader relations between Iran, Israel, and other regional actors?

 

 Israel is going through one of the worst moments in its history. Its image has become radioactive for any politician, and this is even reflecting in its image within the United States itself. Israel needs to rethink several positions and the way it handles its problems. Lebanon, on the other hand, is just the place where Iran disputes military ground with Israel. As much as Lebanon tries to show sovereignty, it exposes a fragile government that keeps being stretched like a rubber band in this war. For Lebanon, the only way forward is the occupation of a large UN force in the south, capable of asserting itself and helping the country build its sovereignty—but strangely, no one discusses this matter. Instead, the UN forces in Lebanon are tiny and lacking resources, deliberately . There is a trio in the region—the Emirates, Jordan, and Azerbaijan—that plays in cooperation with Israel, but the Emirates and Azerbaijan cross that line by maintaining deeper military ties with Israel, which will make any balance in the region impossible. Israel needs to be on the other side of the Middle East, having only the US as its proxy, as it has always been. As it tries to take larger steps, it worsens the entire situation.

 

6. Now that the United States is a co-host of the 2026 World Cup, how does FIFA address concerns about military actions and visa restrictions for athletes and fans? Could these issues affect the tournament’s image?

 

 The US maintains control over global organizations, including sports ones. This governance model is in decline but will still persist for a few years. There is a major lack of legitimacy in institutions, but I do not see reforms, and the trend is a progressive fading of the model we know. I do not see FIFA entering into conflict with the American government for any reason. They will not even criticize any flaws in the organization if they occur. America will find its way at some point and fulfill its responsibilities to the world, but that time not just yet.